Richard Rorty's pragmatism : implications for argumentation theory.

This thesis argues that American pragmatism and contemporary argumentation theory have much in common. Nevertheless the similarities have not been exploited. Difficulties arise, however, in specifying pragmatism. Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey--the major founders of pragmatism--differed from each other on many key points. This thesis looks to the recent work of Richard Rorty for a consistent formulation of pragmatism. Chapter 2 outlines the historical and philosophical background out of which Rorty's pragmatism grew. Peirce coined the word "pragmatism," and for him it meant an emphasis on the kind experimentation and hypothesis testing associated with scientists. Through scientific investigation, objective facts about nature can be made to gradually reveal themselves. James generalized experimental success, and emphasized truth as whatever "worked," or led to desired results. The rigor of scientific communities was replaced by the satisfaction that individuals attain from their beliefs. In the form of what he called "percepts," however, James retained belief that nature could be directly revealed in ways independent of theory or culture. Dewey's views are closest to Rorty's. This thesis focuses on Rorty because Dewey is somewhat dated, having lived before the time when the "linguistic turn" in philosophy flourished and worked through its assumptions. Chapter 3 summarizes the pertinent aspects of Rorty's philosophy. Rorty's positions are that no truth can be known to us except through language, and language necessarily conveys social values. None of these values are beyond question, but the only way to challenge any social practice is by reference to other social practices. Rationality, then, comes to mean agreement with local practices, but an important social practice in a Pragmatic culture is the practice of leaving discussion open. Chapter 4 considers criticisms of pragmatism in general and of Rorty in particular. Many critics have accused pragmatists of ignoring the clear difference between being true and being useful or verified. Generally, the pragmatist translates notions of useless of unverified truth into reference to potential use of verification. The intuition that truth and utility are separable is then simply a product of our language, and can and should be dropped. Attacks on Rorty see him as falsely dichotomizing knowledge as either entirely objective and ahistorical or as purely linguistic or social. Rorty excludes the possibility that our historically situated beliefs may be getting closer to truth by noting that options for belief are increasingly divergent rather than converging toward objective truth. Chapter 5 appliers Rorty's thought to issues in argumentation theory. A Rortian perspective sees argument as tying claims into networks of social practices. Any claim may be called into question, though not all at once, and impartiality is not the goal of argument. Since knowledge cannot be established with certainty, the only stopping point for argument is the need to act. The Pragmatic culture would accept Rorty's view of rationality as no more than social practices, but would then call upon a second sense of rationality as keeping dialectic open. Argument may be convergent, as when agreement is needed to solve a problem, or divergent, as when creative new suggestions are entertained. Finally, a Rortian view lends itself to discerning three types of argument--bad, inconclusive, and strong. Bad arguments may be provocative; inconclusive arguments are those which are highly unlikely to change opinion, but which remind people of each other's humanity; strong arguments do the problem-solving work.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.A.

Level thesis:degree_level

Masters

Grantor

Baylor University.

Year dc:date.issued

1985

Author dc:creator

• Garmon, Steven Meredith.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Rowland, Robert C., 1954-

• Rorty, Richard.
• Pragmatism.
• Philosophy, American -- 20th century.

Statement dc:rights

• Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2104/14293

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/14293