Moral worth, virtue, and accidentally right action : towards a virtue first approach.

The contemporary notion of a morally worthy action—a right action done for the right reasons—is widely recognized as something distinct from but importantly related to acting virtuously. It is somewhat surprising, then, that the relationship between morally worthy action and action from virtue has remained largely unexplored and undeveloped. In this dissertation, I first argue against a way of thinking about the relationship that is often assumed, however implicitly. The Standard View—the thesis that virtue is the stable disposition to perform morally worthy actions—suffers from a host of issues which result from defining virtue in terms of moral worth. Chiefly, the Standard View fails to adequately describe the sense in which doing the right thing for the right reasons is doing the right thing non-accidentally. A Virtue First paradigm, however, reverses this order of dependence, defining moral worth in terms of its resemblance to virtuous activity. I defend a Virtue First view in the final chapter.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Grantor

Baylor University.

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• McCoy, Austin G. (Austin Glen), 1993-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Jeffrey, Anne.

• Moral worth.
• Virtue.
• Right action.
• Non-accidentality.

Statement dc:rights

• Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2104/14006

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/14006