{"id":{"repo_id":"baylor","oai_identifier":"oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/13535"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/baylor/oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/13535","repository":{"repo_id":"baylor","name":"Baylor University","base_url":"https://baylor-ir.tdl.org/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Intelligence and decision making : the Bay of Pigs operation and the Cuban missile crisis.","abstract":"Until the end of the 1950s, for nearly two centuries most political and economic relationships between the United States and Cuba had favored the United States; however, with the triumph of Castro's Revolution and the growing involvement of the USSR in Cuba's political, economic, and military development, the United States lost influence over Cuban affairs and viewed Castro's regime as a threat to its national security. Subsequent crises involving Cuba and the United States in 1961 and 1962 are examined as case studies of intelligence and decision making. At the end of his administration, President Eisenhower decided to sponsor Cuban exiles who would invade the island and establish a new government. Responsibility for directing the project was given to the Central Intelligence Agency; thus, CIA personnel both planned and guided the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation of 1961. In the year following the debacle at Playa de Girón, the United States intelligence community became aware of the presence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy and a circle of close advisors devised a course of action that forced the removal of those missiles by means of a naval quarantine against Soviet ship movements to Cuba. It is apparent that the primary responsibility of the CIA should be to collect and to analyze information, while the planning and directing of military operations should be handled by the Department of Defense. In addition, greater effectiveness in decision making requires accurate, timely intelligence resulting from maximum cooperation within and among the organizations forming the U.S. intelligence community.","abstract_html":"Until the end of the 1950s, for nearly two centuries most political and economic relationships between the United States and Cuba had favored the United States; however, with the triumph of Castro's Revolution and the growing involvement of the USSR in Cuba's political, economic, and military development, the United States lost influence over Cuban affairs and viewed Castro's regime as a threat to its national security. Subsequent crises involving Cuba and the United States in 1961 and 1962 are examined as case studies of intelligence and decision making. At the end of his administration, President Eisenhower decided to sponsor Cuban exiles who would invade the island and establish a new government. Responsibility for directing the project was given to the Central Intelligence Agency; thus, CIA personnel both planned and guided the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation of 1961. In the year following the debacle at Playa de Girón, the United States intelligence community became aware of the presence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy and a circle of close advisors devised a course of action that forced the removal of those missiles by means of a naval quarantine against Soviet ship movements to Cuba. It is apparent that the primary responsibility of the CIA should be to collect and to analyze information, while the planning and directing of military operations should be handled by the Department of Defense. In addition, greater effectiveness in decision making requires accurate, timely intelligence resulting from maximum cooperation within and among the organizations forming the U.S. intelligence community.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Stark, Denise Mosley."],"institution":"Baylor University.","degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Brown, Lyle C."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1981,"date_issued":"1981-08","date_published":"1981-08","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:08:23Z","subjects":["Intelligence service -- United States.","Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.","Cuba -- History -- Invasion, 1961.","United States -- Foreign relations -- Cuba."],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. 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Subsequent crises involving Cuba and the United States in 1961 and 1962 are examined as case studies of intelligence and decision making. At the end of his administration, President Eisenhower decided to sponsor Cuban exiles who would invade the island and establish a new government. Responsibility for directing the project was given to the Central Intelligence Agency; thus, CIA personnel both planned and guided the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation of 1961. In the year following the debacle at Playa de Girón, the United States intelligence community became aware of the presence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy and a circle of close advisors devised a course of action that forced the removal of those missiles by means of a naval quarantine against Soviet ship movements to Cuba. It is apparent that the primary responsibility of the CIA should be to collect and to analyze information, while the planning and directing of military operations should be handled by the Department of Defense. In addition, greater effectiveness in decision making requires accurate, timely intelligence resulting from maximum cooperation within and among the organizations forming the U.S. intelligence community."]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Intelligence and decision making : the Bay of Pigs operation and the Cuban missile crisis."]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Brown, Lyle C."],"dc:creator":["Stark, Denise Mosley."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-07-02T19:31:01Z"],"dc:date.available":["2025-07-02T19:31:01Z"],"dc:date.issued":["1981-08"],"dc:description.abstract":["Until the end of the 1950s, for nearly two centuries most political and economic relationships between the United States and Cuba had favored the United States; however, with the triumph of Castro's Revolution and the growing involvement of the USSR in Cuba's political, economic, and military development, the United States lost influence over Cuban affairs and viewed Castro's regime as a threat to its national security. Subsequent crises involving Cuba and the United States in 1961 and 1962 are examined as case studies of intelligence and decision making. At the end of his administration, President Eisenhower decided to sponsor Cuban exiles who would invade the island and establish a new government. Responsibility for directing the project was given to the Central Intelligence Agency; thus, CIA personnel both planned and guided the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation of 1961. In the year following the debacle at Playa de Girón, the United States intelligence community became aware of the presence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy and a circle of close advisors devised a course of action that forced the removal of those missiles by means of a naval quarantine against Soviet ship movements to Cuba. It is apparent that the primary responsibility of the CIA should be to collect and to analyze information, while the planning and directing of military operations should be handled by the Department of Defense. In addition, greater effectiveness in decision making requires accurate, timely intelligence resulting from maximum cooperation within and among the organizations forming the U.S. intelligence community."],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2104/13535"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:rights":["Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. 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