[Title missing] : on the metaphysics and ethics of omissions.

In this dissertation, I argue for a general analysis of omissions and then apply that analysis to an issue in medical ethics. One omits when they don't act in a particular way, can act in that way, the action was required for some further activity, and one is already (in some sense) engaged in that further activity. I argue, contrary to contemporary analyses, that omissions are inherently normative, in the sense that the action not done was necessary for some good to be achieved. I then apply this analysis of omissions to medical futility, which is when a medical intervention cannot benefit a patient. I argue that we should understand "benefit" as the goods that the patient can seek or that physicians can provide. I then interpret medical futility as practical impossibility, whereby benefitting the patient is impossible, either because it physically cannot succeed or because it would fail to prioritize the relevant goods. Where a treatment cannot benefit the patient, it is futile, and therefore one is not obligated to seek it. In other words, refusing or withdrawing futile treatment does not constitute killing by omission.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Grantor

Baylor University.

Year dc:date.issued

2022

Author dc:creator

• Rea, Joseph Burke, 1991-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Haldane, John.

• Philosophy.
• Action.
• Omission.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret)
• Medical ethics.
• Medical futility.

Statement dc:rights

• Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2104/12323

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/12323