An Analysis of the Relationship between Contemporary Western Military Theory, Systems Thinking, and their Key Schools-of-Thought
Since the 1990s, systems concepts have been used to enhance military theory. Such fusion assumes a strong relationship between systems thinking and military theory. This assumption underpins military concepts such as Effects-Based Operations, which was influential in planning the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. The military failures in these wars led scholars to criticise systems-based concepts within military theory and practice. Nevertheless, practitioners and academics continue to use systems concepts to inform contemporary military doctrine and education. Such education shapes military professionals' thinking on how to plan for, and conduct, war. This thesis investigates the relationship between contemporary Western military theory, systems thinking, and their key schools-of-thought. The thesis identifies that the assumed relationship is founded on a belief that the world is made up of systems. This worldview, known as 'hard systems thinking', is held by both advocates and critics. There appears to be little consideration of the alternative systems worldview: 'soft systems thinking'. This second school-of-thought views the world as complex and uses systems as frameworks to enhance understanding. The thesis explains how these systems paradigms have similarities with the two military theory worldviews of 'war as science' and 'war as art', respectively. Investigating how these schools-of-thought influence systems concepts may help explain when and how to use systems thinking to enhance military theory. The investigation finds a strong relationship between military theory and systems thinking. This relationship is underpinned by the complementary use of both hard and soft systems thinking schools-of-thought. The thesis reviews the works of twelve military writers from across recorded history to find this relationship. The 2003-2011 Iraq War provides an illustrative case study. This case study corroborates the investigation's findings, and provides initial insight into how paradigms can influence military thinking and practice. The investigation indicates that each level of war preferences a school-of-thought. For example, the strategic level of war prefers soft systems thinking and war as art. Hard systems and war as science thinking are relevant to the tactical level of war. Another finding is that systems thinking, when used appropriately, appears to enhance the explanatory and descriptive power of military theory. The thesis found little support for using systems thinking to reinforce the predictive power of theory. The analysis of the theory-based and Iraq War case studies also sheds initial light on how the paradigms military practitioners hold can influence how they think about and execute war. Where practitioners hold paradigms not aligned with the findings in this thesis, military planning and action may risk strategic failure. The thesis finds that Effects-Based Operations, and similar hard systems concepts, appear inappropriate at the strategic and operational levels of war. Next, the thesis identifies a set of principles that may help guide future military warfighting concept development. Another observation is that pre-war military education may be important in shaping pre-war thinking and in-war adaptation. Further research is likely to shed light on how to reduce the hard systems/war as science bias often seen in military thinking and planning. With the contemporary surge in great power competition, limiting these biases may help reduce the likelihood of great power competition becoming great power war.
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