ResearchSpace@Auckland
Assertibility and coordination: Analysing `and' and/or `or', some `some', but not so much `but', `not', `so', or `nor', nor `much'
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis explores how far classical logic, combined with formal restrictions that model some Grice-inspired maxims, can go towards describing the multiple distinct uses of the English natural language connectives `and' and `or'. H.P. Grice famously claimed that `and' and `if' could be completely reduced to the truth-functional connectives `^' and ` ' plus his maxims, so this thesis partakes somewhat of the spirit of his project. However, it is neither Gricean nor neo-Gricean, as conversational implicature is ignored in favour of an appeal to formal and general predictions that can be drawn by an ideal rational cooperative Hearer. This allows the development of formal propositional systems based on norms inspired by Grice's cooperative principle and subsequent maxims. These formal systems seek to capture assertibility, and require some new approaches to logical semantics that are interesting in their own right. Many types of pragmatic phenomena can be described in terms of which minor deviations are required to the utterance form to meet the assertibility criteria. Many of these deviations can be described precisely by formalising additional maxims or borrowing some concepts from cognitive linguistics and formal syntax. Some of the functional-typological distinctions within each of the coordinations `or', `and', and `but' will be compared to a list of predictions produced by assertibility considerations. The principles behind propositional assertibility are then applied to predicate logic, negation, and speech acts such as interrogatives and arguments with some interesting results. An approach to conditionals (`if' clauses) and related subordinating conjunctions such as `when' and `since' is sketched based on linguistic classi cations and assertibility considerations. The assertibility conditions for disjunction also suggest an analysis of the so-called paradox of Free Choice that suggests it is both far more pervasive and simple than previously believed. Finally, the results of this exploration are tallied, along with some puzzles, surprising parallels, and thoughts for further research.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- PhD
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher
- ResearchSpace@Auckland
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Withy, Andrew
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Seligman, J
- McKeown-Green, J
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
- Licence dc:rights.uri
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/2292/21933
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:researchspace.auckland.ac.nz:2292/21933