{"id":{"repo_id":"athens","oai_identifier":"oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5363160"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/athens/oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5363160","repository":{"repo_id":"athens","name":"National and Kapodistrian University of Athens","base_url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/frontend/oaipmh"},"display":{"title":"Plato’s Lysis and Aristotle’s Notion of Friendship","abstract":"Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love.","abstract_html":"Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["XIE YANAN"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:02:00Z","subjects":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["uoadl:5363160"],"render_values":[{"text":"uoadl:5363160","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5363160","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["XIE YANAN"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["born_digital_postgraduate_thesis","Διπλωματική Εργασία","Postgraduate Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["uoadl:5363160","https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5363160"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Plato’s Lysis and Aristotle’s Notion of Friendship"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["XIE YANAN"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["Plato’s Lysis forms the background for Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (philia, φιλία). The dialogue raises four central questions: who is the friend—the lover or the beloved? Are friends alike or unlike? Are friends good or bad people? And what is the deep ground of loving friends? Although Socrates leaves each of these issues in aporia, Aristotle’s account of friendship offers systematic and philosophically illuminating responses. These responses together yield a comprehensive picture of Aristotelian friendship. Friendship is grounded more in loving than in being loved; both similarity and difference can give rise to friendship, though in distinct forms; and while bad people may be friends only in a qualified sense, good people—despite their self-sufficiency—still require friends. The account culminates in Aristotle’s claim that friends are “another self,” a claim that explains why friendship is necessary for decent people without reducing friendship simply to self-love."],"dc:identifier":["uoadl:5363160","https://pergamos.lib.uoa.gr/uoa/dl/object/5363160"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Θετικές Επιστήμες","Science"],"dc:title":["Plato’s Lysis and Aristotle’s Notion of Friendship"],"dc:type":["born_digital_postgraduate_thesis","Διπλωματική Εργασία","Postgraduate Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:02:00Z"}