{"id":{"repo_id":"arizona-thes","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.arizona.edu:10150/650756"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/arizona-thes/oai:repository.arizona.edu:10150/650756","repository":{"repo_id":"arizona-thes","name":"University of Arizona","base_url":"https://repository.arizona.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Role of Market Forces and Regulation in Disclosure: Evidence from Cyber Risk Factors","abstract":"Economic theory generally argues that market forces induce managers to disclose their private information and yet disclosure regulation is pervasive in practice. Using the setting of cyber risk disclosures, I speak to the debate regarding the effectiveness of both market forces and regulation in eliciting disclosure. I find that market forces (specifically, investor demand for managers’ private information) and disclosure regulation have contrasting effects: market forces are associated with higher disclosure quality (i.e., specificity and uniqueness) while regulation is associated with higher disclosure quantity (i.e., amount). These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses, including controlling for the potentially confounding effect of enforcement. I also find that disclosure quality, rather than quantity, is informative to investors. Although subject to important caveats, my collective evidence provides a potential rationale for the pervasiveness of disclosure regulation (i.e., an increase in disclosure quantity) but is also consistent with the narrative that disclosure regulation can be counterproductive.","abstract_html":"Economic theory generally argues that market forces induce managers to disclose their private information and yet disclosure regulation is pervasive in practice. Using the setting of cyber risk disclosures, I speak to the debate regarding the effectiveness of both market forces and regulation in eliciting disclosure. I find that market forces (specifically, investor demand for managers’ private information) and disclosure regulation have contrasting effects: market forces are associated with higher disclosure quality (i.e., specificity and uniqueness) while regulation is associated with higher disclosure quantity (i.e., amount). These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses, including controlling for the potentially confounding effect of enforcement. I also find that disclosure quality, rather than quantity, is informative to investors. Although subject to important caveats, my collective evidence provides a potential rationale for the pervasiveness of disclosure regulation (i.e., an increase in disclosure quantity) but is also consistent with the narrative that disclosure regulation can be counterproductive.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ashraf, Musaib"],"institution":"The University of Arizona.","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"doctoral","degree_discipline":"Graduate College","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Sunder, Jayanthi"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Mergenthaler, Rick","Michas, Paul","Sunder, Shyam"],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-24T00:56:11Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction, presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10150/650756","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Sunder, Jayanthi"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Mergenthaler, Rick","Michas, Paul","Sunder, Shyam"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ashraf, Musaib"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-01-14T20:47:50Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-01-14T20:47:50Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["The University of Arizona."]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Electronic Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Graduate College","Accounting"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Arizona"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright © is held by the author. 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I find that market forces (specifically, investor demand for managers’ private information) and disclosure regulation have contrasting effects: market forces are associated with higher disclosure quality (i.e., specificity and uniqueness) while regulation is associated with higher disclosure quantity (i.e., amount). These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses, including controlling for the potentially confounding effect of enforcement. I also find that disclosure quality, rather than quantity, is informative to investors. Although subject to important caveats, my collective evidence provides a potential rationale for the pervasiveness of disclosure regulation (i.e., an increase in disclosure quantity) but is also consistent with the narrative that disclosure regulation can be counterproductive."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Role of Market Forces and Regulation in Disclosure: Evidence from Cyber Risk Factors"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Sunder, Jayanthi"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Mergenthaler, Rick","Michas, Paul","Sunder, Shyam"],"dc:creator":["Ashraf, Musaib"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-01-14T20:47:50Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-01-14T20:47:50Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:description.abstract":["Economic theory generally argues that market forces induce managers to disclose their private information and yet disclosure regulation is pervasive in practice. Using the setting of cyber risk disclosures, I speak to the debate regarding the effectiveness of both market forces and regulation in eliciting disclosure. I find that market forces (specifically, investor demand for managers’ private information) and disclosure regulation have contrasting effects: market forces are associated with higher disclosure quality (i.e., specificity and uniqueness) while regulation is associated with higher disclosure quantity (i.e., amount). These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses, including controlling for the potentially confounding effect of enforcement. I also find that disclosure quality, rather than quantity, is informative to investors. 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