Money-Back Guarantee, Service Quality, and Productivity: The Marketing of In-Vitro Fertilization
type: CreativeWork
description: Marketing practices like Money-Back Guarantees (MBGs) and warranties are quite controversial in the health care market. Despite their professed intention to improve consumer welfare, MBGs are often decried for taking advantage of consumers who might not have the correct information. This concern is valid especially given the salient features of health care markets: a) customization, b) expert service, and c) difficulty in measuring service quality. For instance, in the context of in-vitro fertilization (IVF)-a medical procedure to assist infertile couples in having children-many health care and policy experts argue that MBGs offered by fertility clinics are nothing but marketing gimmicks and that these clinics either sort and treat only the more fertile patients or overtreat patients with more aggressive and risky treatment protocols. This concern, however, is in stark contrast with the signaling literature in marketing and economics. The central idea of the signaling theory is that the cost of offering MBGs can be so high that low-quality clinics are not able to afford mimicking the high-quality clinics' offering of MBGs. Essentially then, only high-quality clinics would be able to afford MBGs. Given these contrasting viewpoints, my dissertation aims to advance our understanding of the strategic MBG decisions in the health care market. Utilizing data from the U.S. IVF market, I investigate the relationship between MBGs and clinic capability, which contains two aspects: a) service quality, i.e., the effectiveness in transforming input to treatment outcome (or quality output), and b) service productivity, i.e., the efficiency in transforming input to production possibility (or quantity output). Considering the nature of the IVF market, my findings have natural extension to other health care and expert service markets. In chapter 2 (essay one), I empirically examine the underlying mechanism of MBGs-whether MBGs in the IVF market can act as credible signals of quality …
abstract: Marketing practices like Money-Back Guarantees (MBGs) and warranties are quite controversial in the health care market. Despite their professed intention to improve consumer welfare, MBGs are often decried for taking advantage of consumers who might not have the correct information. This concern is valid especially given the salient features of health care markets: a) customization, b) expert service, and c) difficulty in measuring service quality. For instance, in the context of in-vitro fertilization (IVF)-a medical procedure to assist infertile couples in having children-many health care and policy experts argue that MBGs offered by fertility clinics are nothing but marketing gimmicks and that these clinics either sort and treat only the more fertile patients or overtreat patients with more aggressive and risky treatment protocols. This concern, however, is in stark contrast with the signaling literature in marketing and economics. The central idea of the signaling theory is that the cost of offering MBGs can be so high that low-quality clinics are not able to afford mimicking the high-quality clinics' offering of MBGs. Essentially then, only high-quality clinics would be able to afford MBGs. Given these contrasting viewpoints, my dissertation aims to advance our understanding of the strategic MBG decisions in the health care market. Utilizing data from the U.S. IVF market, I investigate the relationship between MBGs and clinic capability, which contains two aspects: a) service quality, i.e., the effectiveness in transforming input to treatment outcome (or quality output), and b) service productivity, i.e., the efficiency in transforming input to production possibility (or quantity output). Considering the nature of the IVF market, my findings have natural extension to other health care and expert service markets. In chapter 2 (essay one), I empirically examine the underlying mechanism of MBGs-whether MBGs in the IVF market can act as credible signals of quality …
author: Yu, Shan
language: en_US
keywords: In-Vitro Fertilization, Money-Back Guarantee, Productivity, Service Quality, Signaling, Management, Health Care Marketing
date published: 2016
date modified: 2026-07-24T00:57:57Z
provider: University of Arizona
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: The University of Arizona.

PropertyValue
property ID: Handle
value: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621296