{"id":{"repo_id":"arizona-thes","oai_identifier":"oai:repository.arizona.edu:10150/288814"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/arizona-thes/oai:repository.arizona.edu:10150/288814","repository":{"repo_id":"arizona-thes","name":"University of Arizona","base_url":"https://repository.arizona.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Institutions, contracts, and asset market prices","abstract":"Tournament incentives have been extensively analyzed, and recommended as policy, by economists and compensation consultants alike. Analysis of tournaments typically looks at the effect of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior in non-market settings (public good provision, team tasks, etc.). In contrast, this work investigates the effect of tournament contracts for individual agents on market performance. In particular, this work investigates the effect on asset market performance of individual contracts that reward \"beating the market\". 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