Adaptive preferences and children's options
type: CreativeWork
description: What should we think of the woman who believes that it is proper for her husband to make all of the family's decisions? How do we respond to the mother who thinks that her domestic abuse is deserved? One popular explanation of such cases is that people's preferences may "adapt" to harmful or unacceptable circumstances that they see as unavoidable, so that they come to endorse states of affairs that they should rightly resist. Yet the concept of adaptive preferences is highly controversial: while its defenders argue that it is a useful tool for understanding the way in which members of marginalized groups can acquiesce to their own oppression and marginalization, its detractors argue that employing the concept unavoidably and disrespectfully treats adults as if they were children who do not know what is good for them. But at the same time, the concept is incredibly under-theorized: defenders and detractors of adaptive preferences alike rarely offer a clear account of the concept against which their claims can be tested. In this thesis, I propose and defend an autonomy-based account of adaptive preferences with four aims: a) conceptual clarity, b) the ability to show respect for persons, d) conduciveness to the political project of reducing marginalization, and d) recognition of and attention to the differential needs of children and adults. To achieve the first aim, I outline what I call an ""indirect substantive"" account of autonomy. This account uses substantive content indirectly to determine whether a person's preferences count as autonomous. Because my account of autonomy uses substantive content indirectly, it allows the possibility that any preference could count as autonomous, and therefore non-adaptive. In this way, it shows respect for persons by recognizing the role that their own processes of moral reasoning play in determining their good. But by using substantive content, I also ensure that the concept can aid the political project. In order for a prefe…
abstract: What should we think of the woman who believes that it is proper for her husband to make all of the family's decisions? How do we respond to the mother who thinks that her domestic abuse is deserved? One popular explanation of such cases is that people's preferences may "adapt" to harmful or unacceptable circumstances that they see as unavoidable, so that they come to endorse states of affairs that they should rightly resist. Yet the concept of adaptive preferences is highly controversial: while its defenders argue that it is a useful tool for understanding the way in which members of marginalized groups can acquiesce to their own oppression and marginalization, its detractors argue that employing the concept unavoidably and disrespectfully treats adults as if they were children who do not know what is good for them. But at the same time, the concept is incredibly under-theorized: defenders and detractors of adaptive preferences alike rarely offer a clear account of the concept against which their claims can be tested. In this thesis, I propose and defend an autonomy-based account of adaptive preferences with four aims: a) conceptual clarity, b) the ability to show respect for persons, d) conduciveness to the political project of reducing marginalization, and d) recognition of and attention to the differential needs of children and adults. To achieve the first aim, I outline what I call an ""indirect substantive"" account of autonomy. This account uses substantive content indirectly to determine whether a person's preferences count as autonomous. Because my account of autonomy uses substantive content indirectly, it allows the possibility that any preference could count as autonomous, and therefore non-adaptive. In this way, it shows respect for persons by recognizing the role that their own processes of moral reasoning play in determining their good. But by using substantive content, I also ensure that the concept can aid the political project. In order for a prefe…
author: Terlazzo, Rosa
date published: 2013
date modified: 2026-07-24T00:55:02Z
provider: Australian National University
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: Australian National University

PropertyValue
property ID: Handle
value: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/155891