Supererogation : definitions, features and characteristics

The object of this thesis is to determine if and how it makes sense to exceed one's duty or to perform acts above or beyond what one is required to do as matters of duty. In philosophical terms therefore, this thesis will study the definitions, features and characteristics of supererogation. In the president's address to the 1984 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, Kai Nielsen reviewed the main trends of post-war philosophical inquiry from Wittgenstein onwards and concluded that philosophical studies were justifiable; (a) if they were "tolerably clear," (b) if there were good grounds for believing them, and (c) if true, whether they are important, "particularly for giving us a grip on who we are, were and who we are to become" (Nielsen, 1985, p.lO). The issue addressed in this thesis is whether the concept of supererogation, as it is used in contemporary philosophical discussion is a valid one, and whether it has any importance for our life in the world as moral agents. Part One of this thesis puts forward a "tolerably clear" account of what is meant by supererogation by explaining how philosophers have traditionally dealt with the issue and how it has been debated and researched in recent years. The variety of reasons advanced by philosophers who advocate its relevance, utility and significance to ethical theory will be examined and the importance of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties to the question of supererogation will be studied. It will be shown that supererogation is compatible with neo-Aristotelianism, modern Christian theology and contemporary contract theory. Part Two analyses arguments for the case against supererogation as held by Kant and most utilitarians. In Part Three the impact of supererogation upon the classification of moral actions is reviewed. In addition, it is shown how supererogation can be correctly positioned in political contexts. Part Three concludes with a reassessment of definitional issues identified in Part One. The purpose of this thesis is to show that supererogation is possible and meaningful as a classification of moral acts but that the definitions of it as proposed by supererogationist writers need improvements. It should be noted from the outset that the study of supererogation has been neglected by modem philosophy for some time, but was recently revived, primarily by Urmson's article on "Saints and Heroes" which appeared in 1958. Since then, an active discussion has taken place in the literature, as proponents of supererogation attempt to carry their case over the objections of many other philosophers, principally utilitarians and defenders of the Kantian tradition. Because the issues discussed in this thesis remain under continuing study by philosophers of many different traditions, it must be admitted that the present work represents an attempt to arrest for the purposes of description, definition and analysis a broadening current of thought which is currently under active development.

Author dc:creator

• Scott, Jon J.

Language dc:language.iso

en_AU

Dc Identifier Other

b17676861

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au:1885/11238