The Eisenhower administration and the concept of massive retaliation

It is the purpose of this thesis to review and to evaluate the historical development of the Eisenhower-Dulles concept of "massive retaliation" from the time of its pronouncement in 1954 until the Eisenhower Administration came to an end in i960. The methodology used in developing this thesis has placed a heavy reliance upon the statements of spokesmen for the Eisenhower Administration and those of its critics. Since many of the statements used were made under the pressures of national and international politics, they were often more meaningful for what they did not say than what they said. The author has quoted sources directly in order to permit the reader to draw his own Inferences. Chapter I develops briefly the emotional, political, and military environment into which "massive retaliation" was born. Chapter II presents the case for the policy of nuclear deterrence, while Chapter III gives the argument against the policy. Chapter IV is a brief conclusion. Throughout the thesis an attempt has been made to penult individuals to speak for themselves so that the reader may reach an independent conclusion on this highly controversial subject.

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Alabama Libraries

Year dc:date.issued

1962

Author dc:creator

• Granger, John Donald

• United States--Foreign relations--1953-1961
• United States--Military policy

Statement dc:rights

• All rights reserved by the author unless otherwise indicated.

Language dc:language.iso

en_US, English

Repository record dc:identifier.uri

https://ir.ua.edu/handle/123456789/17842

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:ir.ua.edu:123456789/17842