{"id":{"repo_id":"adelaide","oai_identifier":"oai:digital.library.adelaide.edu.au:2440/128814"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/adelaide/oai:digital.library.adelaide.edu.au:2440/128814","repository":{"repo_id":"adelaide","name":"University of Adelaide","base_url":"https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Does Firm-Level Political Risk Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?","abstract":"In this study I examine how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects its merger & acquisition (M&A) activities. Consistent with the predictions from real options theory, I find that a firm is less likely to engage in M&A activities and less likely to take large M&A deals when its exposure to political risk is high. This effect is particularly evident when acquirers are taking diversified M&As or when acquirers are influential and dominant in their industry. I also find a positive relationship between the time to deal completion and the acquirer’s exposure to political risk. Additionally, given that prudence and conservatism are motivated by a higher-level of political risk, I show that this leads to acquirers paying lower bid premiums and experiencing a larger increase in shareholder value from M&A deals.","abstract_html":"In this study I examine how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects its merger & acquisition (M&A) activities. Consistent with the predictions from real options theory, I find that a firm is less likely to engage in M&A activities and less likely to take large M&A deals when its exposure to political risk is high. This effect is particularly evident when acquirers are taking diversified M&As or when acquirers are influential and dominant in their industry. I also find a positive relationship between the time to deal completion and the acquirer’s exposure to political risk. Additionally, given that prudence and conservatism are motivated by a higher-level of political risk, I show that this leads to acquirers paying lower bid premiums and experiencing a larger increase in shareholder value from M&A deals.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Liu, Yanlin"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Zurbrugg, Ralf-Yves","Xu, Limin","Luo, Juan"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-24T00:50:41Z","subjects":["Firm-level political risk","mergers and acquisitions"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2440/128814","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Zurbrugg, Ralf-Yves","Xu, Limin","Luo, Juan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Liu, Yanlin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Firm-level political risk","mergers and acquisitions"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2440/128814"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this study I examine how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects its merger & acquisition (M&A) activities. Consistent with the predictions from real options theory, I find that a firm is less likely to engage in M&A activities and less likely to take large M&A deals when its exposure to political risk is high. This effect is particularly evident when acquirers are taking diversified M&As or when acquirers are influential and dominant in their industry. I also find a positive relationship between the time to deal completion and the acquirer’s exposure to political risk. Additionally, given that prudence and conservatism are motivated by a higher-level of political risk, I show that this leads to acquirers paying lower bid premiums and experiencing a larger increase in shareholder value from M&A deals."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Does Firm-Level Political Risk Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Zurbrugg, Ralf-Yves","Xu, Limin","Luo, Juan"],"dc:creator":["Liu, Yanlin"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this study I examine how a firm’s exposure to political risk affects its merger & acquisition (M&A) activities. Consistent with the predictions from real options theory, I find that a firm is less likely to engage in M&A activities and less likely to take large M&A deals when its exposure to political risk is high. This effect is particularly evident when acquirers are taking diversified M&As or when acquirers are influential and dominant in their industry. I also find a positive relationship between the time to deal completion and the acquirer’s exposure to political risk. Additionally, given that prudence and conservatism are motivated by a higher-level of political risk, I show that this leads to acquirers paying lower bid premiums and experiencing a larger increase in shareholder value from M&A deals."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/2440/128814"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:subject":["Firm-level political risk","mergers and acquisitions"],"dc:title":["Does Firm-Level Political Risk Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T00:50:41Z"}