COAG, democracy and the Australian Constitution: you can choose two

A ‘democratic deficit’ has been well identified in the operations of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). This has previously been identified as a primarily political problem. However, perhaps there is more to the story. If COAG is fulfilling a constitutional role as well as a political role, the consequences of its democratic deficit could be far more wide-reaching, threatening the democratic integrity of the constitutional system. In order to determine whether this is the case, this thesis will do two things. First, it will establish whether COAG is a constitutional convention. If this is the case, COAG will be fulfilling a constitutional role and should be considered part of the constitutional framework. Second, this thesis will extrapolate what the consequences of the democratic deficit would be if COAG was a constitutional institution rather than a political one. Answers to these questions will be crucial in developing our system of government to accommodate both democracy and federalism. To do nothing would see democracy further sacrificed in the face of federalism.

Author dc:creator

• Bruerton, Mark Kenneth

Advisors dc:contributor.advisor

• Williams, John Matthew
• Reilly, Alexander Peter

• COAG
• constitutional law
• federalism
• Australian government
• intergovernmental relations

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/2440/101787

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:digital.library.adelaide.edu.au:2440/101787