{"id":{"repo_id":"aachen","oai_identifier":"oai:publications.rwth-aachen.de:61998"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/aachen/oai:publications.rwth-aachen.de:61998","repository":{"repo_id":"aachen","name":"RWTH Aachen University","base_url":"https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/oai2d"},"display":{"title":"Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement with criminal teams, multiple stages, and ex post asymmetric information","abstract":"This thesis analyzes self-reporting as a tool in optimal law enforcement. In particular, the contribution focuses on the option value created by a self-reporting scheme if violators receive private information about their detection or conviction probability extit{after} they have committed a crime (ex-post asymmetric information). This option value creates a drawback of amnesty programs that has not been taken into account in the literature. We derive optimal fine reductions for different crime characteristics (i.e. different degrees of ex-post heterogeneity) analyze the relationship between fine reductions for violators that have not yet been convicted and violators who start to cooperate with the authority already after a litigation started. The remainder of the thesis focuses on self-reporting as a useful enforcement tool against criminal teams. If members of such teams act non-cooperatively in the self-reporting stage, we show that they can be driven into Prisoner's Dilemma situations such that aggregated team fines increase due to a reduction of fines for single self-reporters. Finally, we apply our theoretical findings to a detailed comparison of the corporate leniency programs recently enacted in the EU and the USA.","abstract_html":"This thesis analyzes self-reporting as a tool in optimal law enforcement. In particular, the contribution focuses on the option value created by a self-reporting scheme if violators receive private information about their detection or conviction probability extit{after} they have committed a crime (ex-post asymmetric information). This option value creates a drawback of amnesty programs that has not been taken into account in the literature. We derive optimal fine reductions for different crime characteristics (i.e. different degrees of ex-post heterogeneity) analyze the relationship between fine reductions for violators that have not yet been convicted and violators who start to cooperate with the authority already after a litigation started. The remainder of the thesis focuses on self-reporting as a useful enforcement tool against criminal teams. If members of such teams act non-cooperatively in the self-reporting stage, we show that they can be driven into Prisoner's Dilemma situations such that aggregated team fines increase due to a reduction of fines for single self-reporters. 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If members of such teams act non-cooperatively in the self-reporting stage, we show that they can be driven into Prisoner's Dilemma situations such that aggregated team fines increase due to a reduction of fines for single self-reporters. Finally, we apply our theoretical findings to a detailed comparison of the corporate leniency programs recently enacted in the EU and the USA."]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Aachen : Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University 120 S. : graph. Darst. (2003). doi:10.18154/RWTH-CONV-123599 = Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2003"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement with criminal teams, multiple stages, and ex post asymmetric information"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Feess, Eberhard"],"dc:coverage":["DE"],"dc:creator":["Walzl, Markus"],"dc:date":["2003"],"dc:description":["This thesis analyzes self-reporting as a tool in optimal law enforcement. 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