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Showing 1 to 4 of 4 for “"phenomenal concept strategy"”.

  1. Philosophical Zombies Don't Share Our Epistemic Situation

    … (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do …

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  2. Could consciousness be physically realised?

    I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic arguments for dualism. First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false). Their epistemic status is due to the analytic independence of …

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  3. The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind

    … First, I will argue that there is a general strategy with which the conceivability argument has been defended. Then, I will present what I call the realisers' response to conceivability arguments. In a nutshell, the way to escape conceivability arguments comes down to the distinction between …

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  4. The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind

    … First, I will argue that there is a general strategy with which the conceivability argument has been defended. Then, I will present what I call the realisers' response to conceivability arguments. In a nutshell, the way to escape conceivability arguments comes down to the distinction between …

    anu Repository record for The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind (opens in a new tab)