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Showing 1 to 20 of 115 for “"mechanism design"”.

  1. computer-aided mechanism design

    Algorithmic mechanism design, as practised today, is a manual process; however, manual design and reasoning do not scale well with the complexity of design tasks. In this thesis, we study computer-aided mechanism design as an alternative to manual construction and analysis of mechanisms. In our …

    rice Repository record for computer-aided mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  2. ESSAYS IN MECHANISM DESIGN

    … the 3 papers. Welfare Properties of the Taiwan Mechanism: This paper analyzes the welfare properties of the mechanism Taiwan uses to match students to high schools. I study the Taiwan mechanism under a theoretical model where students share the same ordinal rankings, and a single lottery …

    penn Repository record for ESSAYS IN MECHANISM DESIGN (opens in a new tab)

  3. Essays on mechanism design

    This thesis is a collection of three essays on mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we consider a general Informed Principal Problem in the context of procurement. Both the potential suppliers and the buyer hold some private information: each supplier knows his cost of production, the buyer knows how …

    mit Repository record for Essays on mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  4. Mechanism design with approximate types

    In mechanism design, we replace the strong assumption that each player knows his own payoff type exactly with the more realistic assumption that he knows it only approximately: each player i only knows that his true type [theta]i; is one among a set [Kappa]i, and adversarially and secretly chosen …

    mit Repository record for Mechanism design with approximate types (opens in a new tab)

  5. Essays on auctions and mechanism design

    This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-15 at 11:49.

    uiuc Repository record for Essays on auctions and mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  6. The complexity of optimal mechanism design

    … that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose …

    mit Repository record for The complexity of optimal mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  7. Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework

    … to this challenge, a new field, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, has emerged. One of the most fundamental problems in this field is How to optimize revenue in an auction? In his seminal paper [Mye81], Myerson gives a partial solution to this problem by providing a revenue-optimal auction for a …

    mit Repository record for Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework (opens in a new tab)

  8. Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs

    … concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much …

    mit Repository record for Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs (opens in a new tab)

  9. Mechanism Design Theory for Service Contracts

    This paper presents a novel approach for designing and optimizing maintenance service contracts through the application of mechanism design theory. When offering a contract to its customer, the maintenance service provider seeks to specify contract terms - such as price, service features and …

    vt Repository record for Mechanism Design Theory for Service Contracts (opens in a new tab)

  10. Algorithm and mechanism design with nonlinear preferences

    … planning with a nonlinear objective, dynamic mechanism design with agents of bounded rationality, and economic mechanism design with risk-loving buyers.

    texas Repository record for Algorithm and mechanism design with nonlinear preferences (opens in a new tab)

  11. APPLIED MECHANISM DESIGN AND ECONOMICS OF PLATFORMS

    My first chapter investigates optimal price mechanism for a monopolistic ride-hailing platform in a two-sided market setting. Our main result shows that when consumers' valuation distribution is concave, fully-discriminatory price mechanism is optimal; while when consumers' valuation distribution …

    nus Repository record for APPLIED MECHANISM DESIGN AND ECONOMICS OF PLATFORMS (opens in a new tab)

  12. Computationally Feasible Approaches to Automated Mechanism Design

    … preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechanism design, the goal is to design procedures (mechanisms) for making the decision that work in spite of such strategic behavior, usually by making untruthful behavior suboptimal. In automated mechanism design, the idea is to computationally …

    duke Repository record for Computationally Feasible Approaches to Automated Mechanism Design (opens in a new tab)

  13. Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces

    … the universities from the licensed ideas. This mechanism decreases information asymmetries, increases market liquidity and provides representative license pricing. Smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain are used to eliminate auction corruption through trustless sealed bid auctions. …

    cape-town Repository record for Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces (opens in a new tab)

  14. Dynamic strategic interactions : analysis and mechanism design

    … decision making on the overall system, and the design of new systems with improved performance guarantees. Motivated by this observation, in the first part of this thesis we focus on fundamental structural properties of games, and exploit them to provide a new framework for analyzing the …

    mit Repository record for Dynamic strategic interactions : analysis and mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  15. Matroid prophet inequalities and Bayesian mechanism design

    … rules, these results also have applications to mechanism design. Our results imply improved bounds on the ability of sequential posted-price mechanisms to approximate optimal mechanisms in both single-parameter and multi-parameter Bayesian settings. In particular, our results imply the first …

    mit Repository record for Matroid prophet inequalities and Bayesian mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  16. Essays on dynamic games and mechanism design

    … considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores …

    mit Repository record for Essays on dynamic games and mechanism design (opens in a new tab)

  17. Essays in Behavioral Macroeconomics and Mechanism Design

    … The second part of this thesis, "Essays in Mechanism Design," studies two contentious issues in the allocation of resources in the modern economy: How should we account for diversity when we allocate resources in two-sided matching markets? How should digital goods and information be priced …

    mit Repository record for Essays in Behavioral Macroeconomics and Mechanism Design (opens in a new tab)

  18. Incentive mechanism design for mobile crowd sensing systems

    … thesis, I present a series of novel incentive mechanisms, which can be utilized to effectively incentivize worker participation in MCS systems. The proposed mechanisms not only incorporate workers' quality of information in order to selectively recruit relatively more reliable workers for …

    uiuc Repository record for Incentive mechanism design for mobile crowd sensing systems (opens in a new tab)

  19. Approaches to mechanism design with boundedly rational agents

    This dissertation ties together three papers on mechanism design with boundedly rational agents. These papers explore theoretically whether, and to what extent, limitations on agents' ability to strategically misrepresent their preferences can help a mechanism designer achieve outcomes that she …

    mit Repository record for Approaches to mechanism design with boundedly rational agents (opens in a new tab)

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