Global ETD Search
Search theses and dissertations gathered from participating repositories worldwide. Every result links back to the library that holds it. No account is needed.
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Showing 1 to 13 of 13 for “"Optimal contracts"”.
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Optimal Contracts for Legal Services
This dissertation characterizes optimal contracts for legal services in the presence of asymmetric information. The lawyer-client relationship examined is an application of the general principal-agent problem. The agent (lawyer) takes an action that, together with the realization of a random …
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In search of optimal contracts in the construction building industry
Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1989.
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Towards a unified theory of procurement contract design : production flexibility, spot market trading, and contract structure
… in this work a unified approach and provide the optimal solution to the pricing problem of option contracts for a supplier of an industrial good in the presence of spot trading. Specifically, our approach fully and jointly endogenizes the determination of three major characteristics in contract …
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Relational contracts, incentives and information
… and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the …
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ESSAYS IN MECHANISM DESIGN
… reservation utility is low (such as in principal-optimal contracts). However, the FOA holds when the agent’s reservation utility is at least moderately high (such as in competitive settings where agents receive high rents). Second, our main theorem formally shows that the FOA is valid in a …
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Essays on contract theory and organizational economics
… methodology for identifying contract optimality in the presence of moral hazard. Following the first order approach, a standard method of computing optimal contracts, the paper first proves two theoretical properties of the solutions to the moral hazard problem. First, we show that the …
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Essays in dynamic contracting
… and the second model considers relational contracts when the states are partially persistent. The last model studies preference for delegation with learning. In the first chapter, the costly unobservable action of the agent produces a good outcome with some probability, and the probability …
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Three Essays in Macroeconomics
… general macroeconomics. The first essay is on optimal taxation and capital structure, the second essay is on firm dynamics, and the third essay is on financial crises. The first essay clarifies the role of the corporate income tax: as a form of double taxation) for achieving socially optimal …
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Essays on the Economics of Education
… gains of paying teachers according to varying, optimally-designed linear schemes. The empirical literature considers a variety of schemes that have been evaluated under randomized controlled trials. However, there is little evidence about their relative performance. To better understand these …
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Essays on the Economics of Information
… the economics of information in markets and contracts. The first chapter paper proposes a theoretical framework that combines information design and mechanism design to analyze markets for mediation services between an informed and an uninformed party. The mediator receives compensation from …
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Essays in Macroeconomics with Heterogeneity
… grow out of the constraint as they age up to the optimal, unconstrained size. Next I establish that, for any given age, firm's financing increases in line with the average return on a project. In times of high idiosyncratic uncertainty the financial contract calls for tightening of the borrowing …
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Essays in political economics and information acquisition
… consists of three chapters respectively on optimal contracts to incentivize information acquisition, strategic voting, and conflict of interest. The first chapter, joint work with A. Clark, studies a principal-agent problem with limited-liability where an agent is hired to acquire …
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Essays in development economics
… change their action based on the signal, but contracts between the two agents may be conditioned on signal realizations. An efficient contract in this setting is one that maximizes total surplus subject to satisfying an aggregate resource constraint and ensuring that both agents truthfully …