Global ETD Search
Search theses and dissertations gathered from participating repositories worldwide. Every result links back to the library that holds it. No account is needed.
Results
Showing 1 to 12 of 12 for “"Auction Design"”.
-
ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTIONS AND THE BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP: THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE-REVERSE-AUCTION DESIGN ON SUPPLIER COMMITMENT AND SUPPLIER TRUST
Industrial online-reverse-auctions have become a common procurement strategy used by many firms to reduce the cost of purchased goods and services. The advantages of online-reverse-auctions include significant price reductions, increased purchasing and selling efficiencies, and access to new supply …
-
Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
… become multidimensional: Queueing networks, auction design in multi-item, multi-bidder auctions, network information theory, pricing multi-dimensional financial contracts, among others. We propose a new approach to analyze stochastic systems based on robust optimization. The key idea is to …
-
Existence of competitive equilibria in combinatorial auctions
… natural steady state for iterative combinatorial auctions that maximize social welfare, and therefore the first step in auction design is to establish its existence. Recent work by Baldwin and Klemperer (2012) has proved that the "demand type" of valuations being "unimodular" is a necessary and …
-
Renewable energy auctions in sub-Saharan Africa
… of power. Over the past decade, renewable energy auctions have emerged as an effective mechanism to competitively procure utility-scale private power projects. This thesis sought to analyse successful renewable energy auctions in sub-Saharan Africa and identify the elements contributing to …
-
Mitigating airport congestion : market mechanisms and airline response models
… airport congestion. As a strategic initiative, auctions have been proposed to allocate runway slot capacity. We focus on two elements in the design of such slot auctions -- airline valuations and activity rules. An aspect of airport slot market environments, which we argue must be considered in …
-
Competition and Yield Optimization in Ad Exchanges
… directly from publishers via a simple auction mechanism. The presence of such channels presents a host of new strategic and tactical questions for publishers. How should the supply of impressions be divided between bilateral contracts and exchanges? How should auctions be designed to …
-
Three Essays On The Acquisition Of Information
… informative advertising and competition.;In auctions, the seller's problem derives from the fact that he has imperfect information about the buyer's willingness to pay for the object on sale. However, when the bidders' private valuations are not statistically independent, the auctioneer would …
-
Allocation Mechanisms in Partially Linked Secondary Spectrum Markets: A Theory And Experiment
… the static part of the model and show an optimal auction design for price efficiency. Second, we assume a dynamic structure where buyers can reallocate and show sufficient conditions to reach equilibrium. Finally, we consider the speed of convergence to an equilibrium and prove the equilibrium is …
-
Critical success factors for financing renewable IPPs in South Africa
… At the programme level, the framework evaluates auction design and implementation, including procurement volume distribution, bidder selection criteria, and the efficiency of auctions in ensuring timely project execution (Kruger, 2021). At the project level, the framework considers determinants …
-
Essays on Energy and Behavioral Financial Economics
… 1 - An analysis of Turkey's solar PV auction scheme: What can Turkey learn from Brazil and South Africa? As global investments continue in renewable energy technologies, investment costs have declined significantly. Meanwhile, many governments have shifted from pre-set renewable …
-
Essays in bargaining and auction theory
… Chapter 3 studies efficient and optimal auction design where bidders do not know their values and solicit advice from informed but biased advisors via a cheap-talk game. When advisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize efficient equilibria of static auctions and equilibria of …