How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realism

Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Lennon, James Preston

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Trogdon, Kelly Griffith

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Klagge, James C.
• McPherson, Tristram

• philosophy
• cognitive phenomenology
• moral epistemology
• phenomenal conservatism
• consciousness

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Dc Identifier Other

vt_gsexam:7727

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/73678