Kant's Critical Attitude Towards The Only Possible Argument

A great deal of attention has been paid to Kant's claim in the Critique of Pure Reason that all theoretical attempts to demonstrate the existence of God must necessarily end in failure. What has received considerably less attention is the fact that throughout his pre-Critical period, i.e., the period prior to the 1781 publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops a unique argument in support of the possibility of such a demonstration. It is obvious that the Critical Kant can no longer maintain the validity of the argument which he presents in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763); however, it is not obvious exactly how Kant proves that this argument cannot succeed. This thesis is concerned with providing an explanation of the change in Kant's view concerning the possibility of providing a theoretical demonstration of the existence of God.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

1997

Author dc:creator

• Fisher, Mark

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Jenkins, Eric J.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Pitt, Joseph C.
• Ariew, Roger

• God
• demonstration
• necessity
• possibility
• Kant

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Dc Identifier Other

etd-71397-16133

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/46504