Further evidence of bank window dressing: the effect of Basle Capital Standards

Banks have a suspected motivation to engage in window dressing of regulatory Call reports. Through a more structured definition of window dressing and a higher frequency data set, a more robust test of window dressing is adopted than in previous studies. This study focuses on the possible influence that the Basle Capital Accord may have on bank window dressing. The results suggest that banks have not been inclined to alter balance sheet manipulations following the implementation of the Basle Accord. A rigorous sources and uses analysis further indicates that banks in fact are not strategically window dressing, but merely reacting to customer activity.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Department dc:contributor.department

Economics

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

1996

Author dc:creator

• Estes, Alan W.

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Wentzler, Nancy A.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Reid, Brian K.
• Porter, W. Russell

• banking

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Language dc:language.iso

en

Dc Identifier Other

etd-05092009-040642

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/42565