Concepts, Content, and Consciousness: A Kantian View of Mind

The second problem surrounding a Kantian view of mind concerns the relationship of concepts and consciousness. For Kant concepts are entirely dependent upon mental unity, but this mental unity only results from the actual use of concepts in synthesizing representations. In other words, Kant's account of mind is circular, but I argue that it is not viciously so. In fact, Kant's account of consciousness not only avoids vicious circularity but also provides a useful model for contemporary investigations into consciousness insofar as it accounts for both mental unity and personal consciousness within a functionalist view of mind.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Heikes, Deborah K.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Wagner, Steven J.

• Philosophy

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI9904477

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87606