Abstract
dc:descriptionSince the publication of The Concept of Mind, analytic philosophers have at least paid lip-service to the thesis that mental entities of different sorts belong to different ontological categories. However, few have taken this thesis to heart. Most of those who concern themselves with mental entities work with more-or-less intuitive notions of the various ontological categories. On the other hand, most of those who concern themselves with ontological categories ignore the mental realm. My dissertation takes the above thesis seriously. In it, I answer the question 'To what ontological category do beliefs belong?' The three candidates ontological categories are occurrences, dispositions, and states.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Ph.D.
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Dissertation
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Grantor
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Year dc:date
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Friedman, Lawrence Bruce
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- (UMI)AAI8302861
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/71553