An Experimental Study of Tournaments and Contracts: A Principal's Perspective

Three types of incentive systems that have been modeled in the literature are the tournament, the Holmstrom team contract, and the dichotomous contract. The objective of the present study is to determine experimentally which of these contracts principals perceive to be superior to the others under different conditions of principals' risk aversion, common uncertainty and number of agents (complexity).

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Accountancy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Asechemie, Daniel Pele Samuel

Contributors dc:contributor

• Beck, Paul J.

• Business Administration, Accounting

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8802979

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/71404