Knowledge and Power: Donald T. Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology and Program Evaluation as Social Experimentation

This dissertation argues that the unsatisfactory state of affairs in contemporary program evaluation evidenced by repeated findings of no significant difference is not primarily the result of technical inadequacy, but that it derives from theoretical, especially epistemological, problems. It is claimed that quantitative-experimental as well as qualitative evaluation holds inaccurate foundationalist views of knowledge which practically serve the interests of relatively narrow but powerful groups such as evaluators and sponsors. Foundationalist views of knowledge are those which claim epistemic privilege subject to the allegedly secure foundations of "sense data," "innate ideas," or "Verstehen" from which knowledge can be reliably derived. It is argued that since no such epistemically privileged foundations exist by means of which we can justify our expert knowledge and privileged position as evaluators, philosophers, or social scientists, we have to look to the social, historical, and political conditions within which evaluation is embedded.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Education

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2014

Author dc:creator

• Lakomski, Gabriele

• Education, Philosophy of

Identifier

(UMI)AAI8409798

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/68891