Asset sharing and stakeholder arrangements : human capital investments, the distribution of powers, and the role of property rights and economic institutions

Theories of human capital investment, which emphasize encouraging and protecting investments in human capital, have become salient in rationalizing the adoption of firm asset-sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Yet, mechanisms such as bargaining power have also been a key part of the literature on employee and firm bargaining outcomes. Part of the puzzle with bargaining power as an explanation is that not all forms of bargaining power significantly explain the adoption of firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements. In order to provide an improved explanation for the adoption of these arrangements, we utilize distributive conceptions of property rights and economic institutions to highlight how power is allocated, segmented, and distributed by economic institutions and, thus, impacts firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements.

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2014

Author dc:creator

• Hughes, J. Jerome (Jermaine Jerome)

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Thomas Anton Kochan.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88362

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/88362