Bombs unbuilt : power, ideas and institutions in international politics

Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons in human history, but contrary to virtually every prediction by scholars, relatively few states have acquired them. Why are there so few nuclear weapons states? What factors lead governments to reject and even renounce the ultimate weapon? What do the disconfirmed predictions of widespread proliferation tell us about contemporary theories of international relations? To answer these questions, this study tests 15 hypotheses based on core categories in international politics: power, resources, ideas, and institutions. The hypotheses on power suggest that a state's nuclear decisions are a function of its external threats and its place in the international system. They claim that the slow pace of proliferation can be explained by several factors: a lack of threat, bipolarity, security guarantees, and superpower pressure. The resource hypotheses emphasize material capability, i.e., whether a state has the money, scientific talent, or access to foreign technology required to develop nuclear weapons. Hypotheses on the role of ideas often focus on the beliefs held by decision makers. This study tests the influence of anti-nuclear norms on proliferation decision making. Institutional explanations highlight either domestic institutional arrangements (whether a state is democratic, whether it is liberalizing economically, its organizational politics) or international institutions like the nonproliferation regime. Many of the tests employ a data set consisting of 132 nuclear decisions and outcomes.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2001

Author dc:creator

• Walsh, James Joseph, 1959-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• George W. Rathjens.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8237
• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Identifier URI

http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8237

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/8237