Corporate governance and insider trading

I investigate the relation between corporate governance and insider trading by corporate executives. Despite the general view that trade on non-public information adversely affects capital market participants, the impact of corporate governance on such trading remains relatively unexplored in prior research. I propose an empirical measure that relies on a predicted pattern in stock returns to identify transactions that are more likely to be based on private information and provide evidence to validate the construct. Using this measure, I find that good corporate governance, identified through board and ownership characteristics that have been linked to more effective monitoring of management in prior research, is negatively related to opportunistic insider trading. In supplementary analysis, I provide evidence on the robustness of this relation to an alternative hypothesis and to potential endogeneity. Overall, I conclude that good corporate governance helps to attenuate opportunistic insider trading.

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2008

Author dc:creator

• Rozanov, Konstantin A

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• S.P. Kothari.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45333

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/45333