Fighting for frames or prospects for peace? : building a prospect theory model of ethnic civil war termination

Ethnic civil wars are the most abundant form of large-scale, deadly conflict in the world today, yet the dedicated study of ethnic civil war is relatively new within political science. One empirical observation repeated in the literature is that civil wars are less likely than interstate wars to end in negotiated settlements, and more likely to end in military victory for one side. Recently, scholars have employed expected utility theory and the security dilemma to construct models of how ethnic combatants choose between settling their differences at the bargaining table or on the battlefield. Rooted in the rational choice paradigm, these models draw upon utility calculations and security concerns to describe ethnic combatants' decision processes and explain the low rate of ethnic war settlement. Two problems with these rational choice models, however, are that they cannot account for cases of ethnic war in which combatants elect to continue fighting losing battles when a normatively "rational" settlement is available, and that they do not seem to accurately describe the decision-making behavior of ethnic combatants. In this thesis, I draw upon the principles of prospect theory, a descriptive theory of choice under conditions of risk and uncertainty, to construct a psychological model of ethnic war termination. I argue that ethnic combatants do not behave as rational choice theories suggest; rather, they choose to settle or fight by framing the possible outcomes as gains or losses relative to a subjective reference point. I analyze my theory by comparing it to three prominent rational choice models: Mason and Fett's expected utility theory, Walter's credible commitment theory, and Kaufmann's demographic separation theory. I then perform a first-brush test of my theory by applying all four models to two case studies, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War and the Bosnian Civil War, to determine which model best explains the behavior of the combatants.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2007

Author dc:creator

• Butts, Robert Davis

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Barry Posen.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42939

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/42939