Essays on coordination, cooperation, and learning

This thesis is a collection of essays on coordination and learning in dynamic cooperation games. Chapter One begins by establishing results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. In particular it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. It also discusses selection results when the game lacks dominance regions. Chapter Two uses these results to investigate the impact of miscoordination fear in a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. More specifically, it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. It is shown that lack of common knowledge creates a fear of miscoordination which pushes players away from the full-information Pareto frontier. Unlike in one-shot two-by-two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness, however, by making it harder to coordinate, it does reduce the range of equilibria and gives bite to the notion of local dominance solvability.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2007

Author dc:creator

• Chassang, Sylvain Guillaume

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Abhijit V. Banerjee and Muhamet Yildiz.

• Economics.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39716

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/39716