Efficiency loss in a class of two-sided market mechanisms

This thesis addresses the question of how to efficiently allocate resources among competing players in convex environments. We will analyze the efficiency loss of certain two-sided market mechanisms involving both consumers and suppliers that are natural extensions of Johari's thesis. After gaining intuition about the mechanisms, we show that their worst case efficiency loss approaches 100%. We then introduce some supply-side market mechanisms in a network setting. In the market mechanisms we study, every player submits a bid which specifies a demand or supply function from a parameterized family. Then, the mechanism allocates resources so that supply meets demand.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2007

Author dc:creator

• Neumayer, Sebastian James

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• John N. Tsitsiklis.

• Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/38666

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/38666