Border fixity : when good fences make bad neighbors

Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics. Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of "border fixity" has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely. This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border fixity by studying and comparing four cases.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2006

Author dc:creator

• Atzili, Boaz

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stephen W. van Evera.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37434

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/37434