Game theoretic analysis and agent-based simulation of electricity markets

In power system analysis, uncertainties in the supplier side are often difficult to estimate and have a substantial impact on the result of the analysis. This thesis includes preliminary work to approach the difficulties. In the first part, a specific electricity auction mechanism based on a Japanese power market is investigated analytically from several game theoretic viewpoints. In the second part, electricity auctions are simulated using agent-based modeling.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2005

Author dc:creator

• Ono, Teruo, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• George Verghese.

• Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33857

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/33857