Essays in financial economics

This thesis consists of three essays on various topics in Financial Economics. Underwriter analysts issue recommendations that are on average more favorable than recommendations of other analysts. In Chapter 1, I investigate whether this bias matters for returns, and whether it matters for wealth redistribution between institutional and individual investors. I find that underwriter 'Strong Buy' recommendations for IPOs exhibit inferior performance. For other positive recommendations - 'Buys' for IPOs, and 'Strong Buys' and 'Buys' for SEOs - there are no significant differences between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Institutional reaction to analyst recommendations is broadly consistent with these results. For IPOs, institutions increase their holdings only in response to unaffiliated recommendations. For SEOs, the response to underwriter recommendations is actually somewhat stronger than to non-underwriter recommendations. In addition, there is little evidence that individual investors as a class incur losses by following the 'Strong Buy' recommendations issued by IPO underwriters. Further analysis indicates that conflicts of interest is an unlikely explanation for the favorable bias in underwriter analyst recommendations. Chapter 2 is joint work with professor Jiang Wang. In this essay, we develop a methodology to identify money managers who have private information about future asset returns. The methodology does not rely on a specific risk model, such as the Sharpe ratio, CAPM, or APT. Instead, it relies on the observation that returns generated by managers with private information cannot be replicated by those without it. Using managers' trading records, we develop distribution-free tests that can identify such managers.

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2003

Author dc:creator

• Iskoz, Sergey

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Jiang Wang.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/16969

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/16969