Essays in applied theory

In "Incomplete Contracting with Endogenous Competition," I consider a variant of the incomplete contracting with renegotiation model introduced by Hart and Moore (1988). I study a trading relation between a buyer and seller, where some ex-ante relationship specific investment on the part of the seller is needed to generate value for the buyer. Uncertainty is revealed ex post, in that prior to the investment stage, the buyer does not know which type of service she may need, and it is impossible to describe under what precise circumstances she needs a particular service. The contract can take only two broad forms: (1) a specification of the nature of a service to be provided under all circumstances, or (2) a general option contract, namely, a menu of services that the seller agrees to provide at predetermined terms.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctoral

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2019

Author dc:creator

• Chen, Lizi,Ph. D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Robert Gibbons and Alessandro Bonatti.

• Economics.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122443

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122443