Using a system-theoretic approach to identify cyber- vulnerabilities and mitigations in industrial control systems

Recent cyber-physical attacks, such as Stuxnet, Triton etc., have invoked an ominous realization about the lethality of such attacks and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including power, gas and water distribution control systems. The traditional industrial practice to enhance security posture by utilizing IT security-biased protection methods narrowly focuses on improving cyber hygiene and individual component protection. Albeit essential and a good countermeasure against indiscriminate, non-targeted attacks, the reality of modern industrial control systems is that they are highly complex, interdependent and software-intensive sociotechnical systems. This makes traditional methods of defense largely impotent in the face of targeted attacks by advanced cyber-adversaries - as was demonstrated by Stuxnet.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering and Management Program

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2019

Author dc:creator

• Khan, Shaharyar,S.M.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stuart Madnick and Allen Moulton.

• Engineering and Management Program.
• System Design and Management Program.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122437

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122437