The Problem of Nature in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

<p>In my dissertation, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of nature yields a double meaning: nature as ensemble of genetic and productive processes that are attainable in experience (phenomenal nature) and nature as that which enables this experience (transcendental nature). My thesis is that the two meanings of nature, when taken together, offer a guide to Merleau-Ponty’s final philosophical formulations about “flesh” and the “visible” and the “invisible.” The aim of the dissertation is to trace the salient conceptual and methodological complications entailed by this conception. I argue that the bivalence of the problem of nature in Merleau-Ponty receives a methodological clarification and proves coherent if we pay attention to the way Merleau-Ponty understands the thrust of radicalization in play in Husserl’s later work in phenomenology, especially regarding his expansion of the notion of intentionality.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

PhD

Level thesis:degree_level

Immediate Access

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year dc:date.available

2020

Author dc:creator

• Rotundo, Alessio

Contributors dc:contributor

• Lanei Rodemeyer
• Frederick Evans
• Anthony Steinbock

• nature
• evidence
• operative intentionality
• phenomenology
• ontology
• Continental Philosophy

Language dc:language

English

Repository record dc:identifier

https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1868

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2878