A Philosophical Defense of Judicial Minimalism

<p>This dissertation analyzes, criticizes and ultimately defends judicial minimalism, a contemporary theory of judging that has come to the forefront of American jurisprudence in the early part of the 21st Century. In this dissertation I offer the first formal definition of judicial minimalism, apply that definition to case law and the literature, refute many objections to judicial minimalism including objections based on tough case counterexamples, offer a new version of the argument of epistemic humility and offer a new argument in support of judicial minimalism from the perspective of law and economics.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

Year dc:date.available

2018

Author dc:creator

• Evans, Cory A

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Steven M. Cahn

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Barbara Montero
• Douglas Lackey

• Constitutional Law
• Courts
• Judges
• Jurisprudence
• Law and Economics
• Law and Philosophy
• Rule of Law
• Supreme Court of the United States
• judicial minimalism
• judicial interpretation

Repository record dc:identifier

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2735

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-3763