The religious mind: An evolutionary argument for theological non-realism

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations.

Name thesis:degree_name

PhD

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

ResearchSpace@Auckland

Year dc:date.issued

2004

Author dc:creator

• Walker, Ruth Marianne Donovan

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• John Bishop

Statement dc:rights

• Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only. Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2292/82

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:researchspace.auckland.ac.nz:2292/82